



MINSK RADAR

PILOT ISSUE · JUNE 2026



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Minsk Dialogue Council
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Minsk Radar

Pilot issue · June 2026

Quarterly monitoring of regional security. Minsk Dialogue Council on International Relations

Contents

Foreword.....2

Overview.....3

Belarus.....6

The Kaliningrad Exclave.....9

Poland.....12

Latvia.....16

Lithuania.....21

Event Catalogue.....24

Annex.....29

Authors.....35

FOREWORD

The Minsk Dialogue Council on International Relations is launching a new monitoring product, Minsk Radar. In many respects, it is the successor to the Council's long-running project, the Minsk Barometer, which analysed Belarus's foreign policy across five dimensions, as well as the state of security in the region.

Radical changes in the regional security situation have called for new approaches and methods of analysis. Nevertheless, the monitoring remains grounded in the quantification of events and in the aim of moving away from subjective assessments of developments by relying predominantly on quantitative research methods.

Minsk Radar analyses the dynamics of the military and military-political situation in the region around the Suwałki Corridor — a complex junction of the borders of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the CSTO that is often described as a potential focal point of military danger. Hostilities in Ukraine have been deliberately excluded from the monitoring, as they require more specialised examination. At the same time, the actions of Russia and Ukraine in the context of the conflict affect the situation in the region and are taken into account indirectly in Minsk Radar.

Each quarter, the monitoring collects and analyses events in Belarus, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast that affect the escalation or de-escalation of tensions between military-political blocs. Each event is assigned a numerical value depending on the degree of its impact. The resulting figures make it possible to judge the direction and speed of the region's movement along the escalation ladder. The monitoring methodology is set out in greater detail in the annex.

The main objective of this pilot issue, covering the events of June 2026, was to test the research methodology and to refine it in the course of subsequent expert discussions.

Dzianis Melyantsou

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OVERVIEW

In June 2026, 77 **events** were recorded and scored across the five monitored entities. The regional index — the median of the five entities’ indices — stood at **-21**, placing the region in the yellow zone of the monthly scale: “activity capable of leading to escalation”.




Figure 1. Indices of the monitored entities, June 2026. Colour corresponds to the zone on the monthly colour scale.




Figure 2. Index by monitored entity (sum of event scores). Dashed lines — zone boundaries; light blue line — regional index (median).




Figure 3. Mean event score by monitored entity (index / number of events; the index and number of events are shown below each name). The indicator reflects the intensity of events irrespective of their number: Latvia has the “heaviest” events on average, while Belarus’s low mean event score is explained by the share of de-escalatory events (5 of 15). Light blue line — mean score of all 77 events in the region.




Figure 4. Position of the monitored entities on the monthly colour scale of regional tension.

Summary table of indices, June 2026

For the “Region” row, the number of events is the total across all entities; the index and its intra- and extra-regional components are medians across the five entities. An event scored 0 is neutral.

Monitored entity	Events	Escal. / de-escal.	Index	Intra.	Extra.	Mil.	Pol.	Zone
Belarus	15	10 / 5	-5	-7	+2	-8	+3	green
Kaliningrad Oblast	7	6 / 1	-6	-6	0	-7	+1	green
Poland	17	14 / 3	-21	-1	-20	-24	+3	yellow
Latvia	20	19 / 0	-28	-13	-15	-23	-5	yellow
Lithuania	18	17 / 1	-23	-14	-9	-18	-5	yellow
Region (median)	77	—	-21	-7	-9	—	—	yellow




Figure 5. Military and political spheres: sums of scores, not numbers of events. In all five cases the escalatory dynamics are driven by the military sphere; in Poland, Belarus and Kaliningrad Oblast the political sphere yields a positive balance.




Figure 6. Extra- and intra-regional events: sums of scores. For Poland, 20 of the 21 index points derive from events involving extra-regional partners; the indices of Belarus and Kaliningrad Oblast are shaped predominantly by intra-regional events.

BELARUS

-5

index (sum of scores)
green zone

15 events


escalation: 10
de-escalation: 5

-0.3

mean event score
index / number of events


1. Military and political spheres

sum of scores: escalatory events (-) to the left, de-escalatory (+) to the right



2. Extra- and intra-regional events

sum of scores: escalatory events (-) to the left, de-escalatory (+) to the right



3. Distribution of events by score

bar height = number of events with a given score; total 15 events



In June, Belarus continued, at its usual pace, to prepare its armed forces for a possible military conflict, while simultaneously signalling that such a scenario was undesirable. These processes unfolded against the backdrop of continuing militarisation and intensifying military activity by European countries, as well as more aggressive rhetoric by Ukraine towards Belarus.

At the beginning of the month, a territorial defence training assembly was held in Vitebsk Oblast for the senior personnel of territorial defence command bodies. The programme included sessions on organising ambush operations, protection against unmanned aerial vehicles and the engineering preparation of deployment areas. [According to](#) the Chief of the General Staff, Pavel Muraveiko, who observed the practical activities, the number of reservists and of activities conducted with territorial defence command bodies and

territorial troop units will increase every year. Approximately one-third of the reservist pool will be allocated to these purposes.

The Air Force and Air Defence Forces held a flight-tactical exercise involving three air bases. [A distinctive feature](#) of the exercise was that a number of non-standard tasks were practised for the first time. Foremost among these were the redeployment of aviation and flights as control targets [Translator's Note: "control targets" (контрольные цели) are aircraft simulating hostile air targets for the training of fighter, air defence and radar crews.]. A large number of aircraft were involved, with more than 30 aircraft airborne simultaneously. Another feature of the exercise was mass night-time flights to the range by three aviation military units operating in coordination. Combat employment at air weapons ranges was also carried out, with forward air controllers providing real-time guidance and directing aircraft, including over secure communication channels. During the exercise, guided missiles were employed at night for the first time.

On 17 June, a mobilisation exercise involving the region's military commissariats began in Grodno Oblast. Although the Ministry of Defence had [announced](#) the exercise well in advance, on 8 June, and described it in detail, the event triggered a wave of alarmist reports in Ukrainian and Western media claiming that a real mobilisation was under way in Belarus, together with preparations for an attack on Ukraine.

On 17 June, a working meeting between the Chairman of the State Authority for Military Industry (SAMI), Dmitry Pantus, and the First Deputy Director of Russia's Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSVTS), Andrei Boitsov, took place in Minsk. The main outcome of the meeting was the [signing](#) of a Roadmap of joint projects for the comprehensive servicing of aviation equipment in the near term. The document sets out specific steps for cooperation between enterprises of the two countries in the restoration and modernisation of aircraft on behalf of foreign states.

On 18 June, the President held a meeting on adjusting the Armed Forces Construction and Development Plan for 2026–2030. The main approaches to the development of the army were identified: enhancing the effectiveness of air defence, countering unmanned aerial vehicles and training officers. However, Alexander Lukashenko questioned the advisability of switching the entire armed forces over to drones under current conditions and called for a comprehensive approach to military development.

In the course of this and a number of other meetings and events, the President and the heads of the security agencies spoke publicly about developments concerning Ukraine that had attracted wide resonance in the information space: Zelensky's ultimatum over the relays [Translator's Note: this refers to signal-relay (repeater) equipment on Belarusian territory that Kyiv alleged was being used to guide Russian strike drones.] and the drone strike on a bus carrying Belarusian children in Bryansk Oblast.

In form and content, these statements were aimed at de-escalation and at keeping Belarus from being drawn into the military conflict. At the same time, Lukashenko [stated](#) the need

to strengthen the protection of the border with Ukraine: *“The southern border — one and a half thousand kilometres (you know this, our military are stationed there) — is ablaze as never before. Here is the answer to some military people as to whether we need to protect the southern border under an enhanced regime or not. Here is the answer. We do. We are military people; the people feed us at their own expense so that we can protect these people.”*

From 25 to 27 June, Minsk hosted the 4th International Anti-Fascist Congress, organised by the Ministry of Defence of Belarus. The declared main theme of the event was countering the spread of the ideas of fascism and Nazism in the modern world, strengthening international security and defending historical truth. The speeches of congress participants (including Belarus’s highest officials) contained a great deal of criticism of the leadership of Western countries over manifestations of neo-fascism in their countries and in Ukraine, which they support.

For instance, Minister of Defence Viktor Khrenin [said](#) in his speech: *“In countries neighbouring us, a decision has already been taken at the state level to destroy monuments to the feat of the Soviet people. Marches of Nazis and collaborationists, Russophobia, the rewriting of history — all of this causes us enormous alarm, because it is precisely the ideas, the ideology of fascism that is beginning to raise its head. And the attempts by Western countries to rewrite history are nothing other than the revival of modern Nazism.”*

In early June, the House of Representatives of the National Assembly [ratified](#) the protocol amending the Treaty between Belarus and Russia on the Development of Military-Technical Cooperation of 10 December 2009. In particular, the protocol expands the list of entities classed as authorised organisations on the Belarusian side and changes the procedure for concluding contracts and compiling lists of military products to be supplied. The list of organisations entitled to procure military-technical property independently has been expanded; the procedure for purchasing components for the maintenance and repair of weapons and military equipment has been simplified; and the cost of procured items of armaments, military and special equipment has been reduced where military acceptance services are provided.

THE KALININGRAD EXCLAVE

-6

index (sum of scores)
green zone

7 events


escalation: 6
de-escalation: 1

-0.9

mean event score
index / number of events


1. Military and political spheres

sum of scores: escalatory events (-) to the left, de-escalatory (+) to the right



2. Extra- and intra-regional events

sum of scores: escalatory events (-) to the left, de-escalatory (+) to the right



3. Distribution of events by score

bar height = number of events with a given score; total 7 events



In June, the political situation around Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast was shaped by the actions of neighbouring EU/NATO member states which, irrespective of the intent of each individual actor, were collectively directed at demonstrating the oblast's vulnerability. These actions included high-profile rhetoric, in which two statements stood out. On 21 May, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys stated that NATO had the capabilities to "level" the air defence systems and missile bases in Kaliningrad. And on 15 June, the Chief of the German Air Force (Luftwaffe), Holger Neumann, declared the German Air Force's readiness to go to war with Russia immediately if required, stressing that the greatest damage in a confrontation between Russia and NATO would be inflicted on Kaliningrad Oblast, the Kola Peninsula and the Black Sea waters. This was accompanied by active discussion in Western media of the possibility of isolating the Russian exclave on the Baltic.

This was followed by the multinational exercise *Dzielny Dzik 2026* (“Brave Boar”), involving Poland, Lithuania and France, in the Suwałki Corridor near the borders of Kaliningrad Oblast (16–26 June). Russian experts [believed](#) that the exercise was aimed at “cutting the only railway line linking the Russian exclave with the main territory of Russia”, at preparing for a naval blockade and at completely severing Kaliningrad Oblast from Russia.

The actual reaction of Russian state bodies to this campaign was restrained. In contrast to the NATO exercises in Finland and Norway (part of *Ramstein Flag 26*), regarding which Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov [stated](#) on 8 June that “Russia is taking the necessary measures to ensure its security”, specifically on the *Dzielny Dzik* exercise only Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko [commented](#), on the sidelines of the Primakov Readings on 23 June. He gave assurances that Russia was monitoring the course of the exercise and “if necessary, is ready to take measures to protect its interests and ensure security”. In the current situation, this is de facto a de-escalatory step.

The exercises of the Russian armed forces in the Kaliningrad Oblast area did not include responses to the NATO actions described above. Their maximum scale reached a squadron or two corvettes, which are poorly suited to offensive operations. Against the background of the restrained reaction of Russia’s central authorities to NATO’s attempts to point out — in words and deeds — the vulnerability of Kaliningrad Oblast, part of the response took place at the less public, regional level. In particular, a decentralisation of security policy was noticeable.

On 26 June, the regional government of Kaliningrad Oblast [announced](#) its intention to expand the list of Rosgvardia (National Guard of Russia) personnel eligible for the regional monthly cash supplement and to increase its amount two- to threefold. By decree of the Governor of Kaliningrad Oblast, Alexei Besprozvannykh, a Ministry of Regional Security was established, which began operating on 29 June. This is clearly a forced step, as the ministry is being set up even through the redistribution of personnel within regional structures. The new ministry is responsible not only for civil defence and emergencies, but also for interaction with the security agencies, including the protection of the state border and the prevention of emergencies at military facilities. The ministry is headed by an army colonel. No similar structures exist in other regions of Russia.

Steps were also taken at the oblast level to strengthen defence capability through (a) reinforcing ties with the rest of Russia, combined with (b) entrenching the principle of renouncing ties with neighbours, as well as a drive towards (c) autarky in critical areas such as food supply.

This is leading to a strengthening of trends towards securitisation and the expansion of restricted-access areas. For example, since 1 June a zone closed to navigation has been established in the Baltic Sea waters in the area of the terminal for the receipt, storage and regasification of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Kaliningrad Oblast.

In a situation where neighbouring countries are successfully restricting even critically important rail transit to Kaliningrad Oblast — for example, of fuel (since November, Lithuanian Railways has halted the carriage of Lukoil products under US and UK sanctions) — it is possible to speak of the beginning of an irreversible winding-down of fundamental infrastructure in the region. This is part of the military confrontation, to which Moscow is responding by adapting to the new reality, which appears to be the cheapest course of action compared with attempts to counteract the changes. During the fuel shortage that arose in Kaliningrad Oblast in June, the authorities [stressed](#) that the oblast is supplied with fuel entirely by sea. In fact, this is already a rather old approach: as long as ten years ago, the then Secretary of the Security Council of Russia, Nikolai Patrushev, [set out](#) a course towards abandoning the search for compromises with neighbouring countries on transport links, describing the “Ust-Luga – Baltiysk – Ust-Luga” ferry line as the only reliable artery.

A new example of the policy of tying Kaliningrad Oblast to the rest of Russia while bypassing its neighbours was the course towards increasing passenger air services at subsidised fares between Kaliningrad Oblast and the rest of Russia.

This policy is complemented by a course towards self-sufficiency, which is also being securitised and viewed in the context of the conflict with EU/NATO. On 23 June, the head of Kaliningrad Oblast [stated](#) that the oblast already meets 70% of its own food needs, but that the task is “*to achieve full food security*”. He recalled the context of these aspirations, linked to “*sanctions restrictions on the part of neighbouring states*”.

However, both tying the oblast to the rest of Russia and autarky may prove to be difficult tasks owing to the natural characteristics of the small Kaliningrad Oblast. For example, as a result of the break-up of the BRELL power system (Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and the impossibility of connecting Kaliningrad Oblast’s power grids with the rest of Russia or Belarus, the oblast’s energy sector appears vulnerable, especially in the event of a military confrontation. These problems in the civilian supply of Kaliningrad Oblast are compounded by military difficulties in its defence (in effect, the main option chosen appears to be graduated nuclear deterrence [Translator’s Note: the Russian “постепенное” (literally “gradual”) denotes a stepwise escalation of deterrence rather than a slow timeline.], beginning with non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons) and explain the paradoxically restrained reaction of the Russian authorities to the latest campaign by EU/NATO states.

POLAND

-21

index (sum of scores)
yellow zone

17 events


escalation: 14
de-escalation: 3

-1.2

mean event score
index / number of events

1. Military and political spheres

sum of scores: escalatory events (-) to the left, de-escalatory (+) to the right



14 events · net -24


escalation: 14 (-24) · de-escalation: 0 (0)

3 events · net +3

escalation: 0 (0) · de-escalation: 3 (+3)

2. Extra- and intra-regional events

sum of scores: escalatory events (-) to the left, de-escalatory (+) to the right



11 events · net -20

escalation: 11 (-20) · de-escalation: 0 (0)

6 events · net -1

escalation: 3 (-4) · de-escalation: 3 (+3)

3. Distribution of events by score

bar height = number of events with a given score; total 17 events



The significance of the war in Ukraine for the countries of the region is declining without any lessening in the intensity of the confrontation with Russia, as is evident from the conflict between Ukraine and Poland. Kyiv's role in the confrontation with Moscow has ceased to overshadow all other factors. On 18 June it became known that Poland would forgo the transfer of MiG-29s to Ukraine, and that Ukraine would not transfer UAV technology to Poland. The *Ukraine Recovery Conference* was held in Gdańsk on 25–26 June, but President Zelensky declined to take part in it. There are grounds for linking the conflict to the unprecedented Ukrainian–German rapprochement (of which the May visit to Berlin by a Ukrainian delegation led by Zelensky formed a part), which is weakening Poland's position in the region, rather than to historical disputes (the glorification of the OUN-UPA in Ukraine at the state level has been taking place since the early 2010s).

Warsaw is responding to the weakening of NATO by intensifying bilateral relations in the military sphere. These, however, have also been affected by the aforementioned disputes. On 17 June the defence ministers of Poland and Germany signed an agreement on military cooperation. It emphasises the development of infrastructure (including the construction of the East Shield (Tarcza Wschód) fortifications), cyber operations and cooperation in the Baltic Sea. It does not contain the mutual security guarantees proposed by Berlin, similar to those written into Poland's treaties with France last year and with the United Kingdom this year. This means forgoing a permanent German military presence in Poland and hampers the possibilities for the entry of German troops. Polish officials [describe](#) the document as a "standard allied procedure" and maintain that it introduces no substantive changes. In reality, however, it is lower in status than a similar intergovernmental framework agreement of 2011. Such agreements, concluded by Warsaw over the past year and a half, duplicate a number of NATO obligations and procedures, but strengthen or weaken them with respect to each of the countries concerned.

In June the build-up of the Polish army continued — in both personnel and armaments. On 10 June Deputy Minister of National Defence Stanisław Wziątek [stated](#) that the army should reach the target of 300,000 professional soldiers (500,000 troops including reservists) by 2039, and most likely earlier. The expansion of the army implies a heavy burden in terms of Poland's economy and mobilisation resources, one that will be several times greater than the comparable burden on Germany, for instance. The manning priorities named include: 1) continuing the formation of the 18th Mechanised Division in the Masovian and Lublin Voivodeships; 2) the transformation of the 16th Mechanised Division in the Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship (near the borders of Kaliningrad); 3) the creation of the 1st Legions Infantry Division in Podlasie.

Warsaw is continuing its policy of hasty rearmament of the army. On 10 June Secretary of State at the Ministry of National Defence Paweł Bejda [confirmed](#) plans to purchase 1,000 K2 tanks under the 2022 framework agreement with *Hyundai Rotem*, with a further 180 tanks to be delivered in 2026–2030, after which the majority of the vehicles will be assembled in Poland. Poland already has more tanks than Germany and France combined; Warsaw continues to purchase the most expensive vehicles from Korea in order to consolidate its military superiority on a continental scale. What is at issue is the creation of an offensive potential, since the procurement of tanks (and of a substantial number of bridge-layers) is being combined with investment in rocket artillery.

That said, priority was given to purchases from the United States. On 12 June the first F-35s were officially accepted into service. The contract for the delivery of 32 F-35s, worth \$4.6 billion, was signed in 2020, becoming the second most expensive in the country's history. All the aircraft will arrive by 2029 and will be stationed at Łask (near Łódź) and Świdwin (West Pomeranian Voivodeship). A US representative at the ceremony marking the aircraft's entry into service announced a \$4 billion increase in the funds available to Warsaw under the Foreign Military Financing programme. In this connection, on 15 June a decision was

announced to purchase a further 32 F-35s by 2039. Warsaw is purchasing the aircraft in haste, as evidenced by the official admission that for the time being the Polish army has only four pilots ready to fly them.

On 24 June a contract was signed for the delivery to the Polish army of a further 46,000 *Grot* assault rifles worth €138.5 million. In total, 110,000 such rifles have now been procured. As the Ministry of National Defence emphasises, this became possible because many other types of armament could be purchased with funding from the EU's *SAFE* programme.

On 25 June Minister of National Defence Kosiniak-Kamysz announced another delivery of Abrams tanks: 36 *M1A2 SEPv3* main battle tanks and seven *M88A2 HERCULES* armoured recovery vehicles will enter service with the 1st Armoured Brigade of the 18th Mechanised Division, which covers the country's eastern border. A further fifty or so combat engineering vehicles and bridge-layers are expected to be delivered to the same brigade. In June it became known that another battalion of the 19th Mechanised Brigade, stationed in Lublin, would be re-equipped from T-72 and PT-91 tanks with American *M1A1 FEP* Abrams.

In total, Poland purchased 250 *M1A2 SEPv3* tanks in 2022 and 116 *M1A1* tanks in 2023.

On 29 June an agreement was signed under which Poland purchased three A26 submarines from Sweden and leased one A17 (Södermanland-class) submarine.

Warsaw is actively drawing on foreign troops to build up its forces. On 16 June the government adopted a resolution launching the official process of establishing a US military base. The day before, during his visit to the United States, President Nawrocki described a permanent US military presence in the country as a “strategic goal” of the Polish state. On 23 June it [emerged](#) that the possibility of locating the base in Poznań or Wrocław, which have large airfields, was under consideration. The US troop presence will number around 5,000, while Polish expenditure on creating the conditions for the US base will reach €2.3–2.8 billion. The Polish government's task in this respect is complicated by Washington's intention to reduce its presence in Europe.

An important strand of Polish military policy is the aspiration to join the programmes for the joint use of the nuclear weapons of the United States and France [Translator's Note: this refers to NATO's US-led nuclear-sharing arrangements and to France's proposals to give its nuclear deterrent a European dimension.]. In early June, preliminary behind-the-scenes negotiations concerning Poland and the Baltic states on expanding the geography of the deployment of US strategic bombers carrying nuclear weapons became [known](#). On 18 June Minister of National Defence Kosiniak-Kamysz [stated](#) that NATO countries had committed themselves to developing nuclear deterrence capabilities.

Military exercises focused on the Kaliningrad area. Near the borders of Kaliningrad Oblast, operations in the Suwałki Corridor were rehearsed, including a combined assault involving helicopters, infantry and naval forces, as well as water-obstacle crossing operations.

In the development of the defence industry, the trend towards increasing ammunition production is particularly noticeable. On 15 June Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ, “Polish Armaments Group”) and the French company *Eurengo* signed an agreement to establish a joint venture for the production of propellant charges for 155 mm artillery shells. The shortage of these charges is currently one of the main problems facing the EU/NATO defence industry. Germany’s *Rheinmetall* responded immediately to the French move, likewise proposing that Warsaw set up production of these charges. On 18 June the *Niewiadów* group concluded a strategic agreement with the French company *KNDS* on launching production of 155 mm long-range artillery ammunition in Poland.

Warsaw, as the largest recipient of EU funds, relies on the EU’s capabilities, including in the development of its defence industry. At the end of June a Ministry of National Defence representative [stated](#) that Poland had become the first EU country to complete the procedures associated with launching the EU’s *SAFE* mechanism, which supports the development of the arms industry. Poland has already concluded contracts worth €27.7 billion financed through this mechanism, mainly for domestic production, and can use a further €13.8 billion.

The rapid militarisation is causing domestic political turbulence. Polish society opposes the enormous expenditure and borrowing, as follows even from a [poll](#) conducted by IBRiS for Defence24 and published on 12 June. More than 76% oppose a war tax, and over 64% oppose cuts to social benefits to finance preparations for war.

Discontent is also being expressed at the elite level, for example regarding [purchases in the United States](#). The purchase of submarines from Sweden is also criticised, with hints at a corruption component: such vessels were last built to a Swedish design thirty years ago, for Australia, and their quality subsequently drew complaints. The loss of part of Sweden’s knowledge and skills in this field is evidenced by the repeated postponement of construction deadlines for such vessels for its own navy.

In parallel, the conflict between Poland’s conservative President and its liberal government continues. President Nawrocki used even the F-35 entry-into-service ceremony for a domestic political attack, while Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sikorski accused the President of being the reason the level of the military agreement with Germany had to be lowered.

LATVIA

-28

index (sum of scores)
yellow zone

20 events


escalation: 19
de-escalation: 0 · neutral: 1

-1.4

mean event score
index / number of events

1. Military and political spheres

sum of scores: escalatory events (-) to the left, de-escalatory (+) to the right




16 events · net -23 (incl. 1 scored 0)
escalation: 15 (-23) · de-escalation: 0 (0)

4 events · net -5
escalation: 4 (-5) · de-escalation: 0 (0)

2. Extra- and intra-regional events

sum of scores: escalatory events (-) to the left, de-escalatory (+) to the right



11 events · net -15 (incl. 1 scored 0)
escalation: 10 (-15) · de-escalation: 0 (0)

9 events · net -13
escalation: 9 (-13) · de-escalation: 0 (0)

3. Distribution of events by score

bar height = number of events with a given score; total 20 events



Latvia's security policy in June 2026 was shaped primarily by the task of countering drones. A [series of incursions](#) by drones culminated on 7 May, when a Ukrainian drone [en route](#) to targets in Russia was diverted from its course and [crashed](#) at an oil depot in Rēzekne. This incident [became the occasion for the resignation](#) of Defence Minister Andris Sprūds and also served as a catalyst for the departure of Prime Minister Evika Siliņa. The new transitional government of Andris Kulbergs declared ensuring the country's security and protection against drones to be one of its priority areas. The priority of this task was reinforced by the incident of 8 June, when, for the first time in Latvia's history, NATO fighter aircraft — French Rafales of the Baltic Air Policing mission — [shot down](#) a foreign drone in its airspace.

On the one hand, officials [emphasised](#) the success of the interception as evidence that NATO's air defence system is capable of repelling a threat in a timely manner. On the other hand, the incident exposed a key problem: intercepting a cheap drone with an expensive air-to-air missile is economically unjustified. President Rinkēvičs and Prime Minister Kulbergs [described](#) the use of NATO fighter aircraft as “not a long-term solution” and stated the need to develop national air defence capabilities. This logic determined Latvia's response in June 2026 along two lines — the production and the testing of counter-drone weapons.

In line with this logic, on 23 June the Estonian defence start-up Frankenburg Technologies [opened](#) a plant in Riga for the assembly of Mark I guided air defence missiles — a short-range interceptor of “ultra-short range”, which is positioned as a counter-drone missile and is [designed](#) to engage UAVs up to Class 3. This is the first missile production facility in the Baltics and a practical [step](#) towards the creation of a “field manufactory” [Translator's Note: the term corresponds to Frankenburg Technologies' own “FieldFoundry” model of deployable, high-volume missile production.] for affordable mass output — with [output scheduled to reach](#) a capacity of up to 100 missiles per day by the end of 2026, which will make it possible to reduce the cost of interception by more than a factor of ten and to ensure mass production for allies.

Latvia's cooperation with allies in the production of interceptor drones also continued to develop in June. On 15 June Latvia and the United States [signed](#) a letter of intent on cooperation in the development of unmanned and counter-drone systems and on the improvement of procurement processes. The agreement opens access for Latvia to the US Armed Forces' digital marketplaces for unmanned systems — both as a buyer and as a supplier — thereby introducing a transatlantic element into the development of the Latvian UAV industry. At the same time, cooperation with Ukraine in the field of unmanned systems was also taken further. On 9 June in Tallinn, following the first meeting between Zelensky and Kulbergs, a “drone deal” was [signed](#): Latvia is helping to strengthen Ukrainian air defence through deliveries and the financing of production, while Ukraine, in turn, supplies Latvia with drone systems and shares its combat experience. As a follow-up to the deal, a planned joint Latvian–Ukrainian drone factory in Latgale was [announced](#) at the end of the month.

In June a series of tests of new interceptor systems took place in Latvia. From 31 May to 5 June the Sēlija training area was the [venue](#) for the first-ever EU-wide training course for operators of strike and interceptor drones, with the participation of 14 EU member states. The programme [included](#), in particular, the interception of fixed-wing drones imitating Russian one-way attack (kamikaze) drones. Support for the development of air defence was also provided by the exercise Baltic Zenith 2026 — annual multinational manoeuvres during which short-range air defence firing at aerial targets is [practised](#). Within the framework of the exercise, Latvia tested interceptor drones developed by the private companies Origin Robotics and Eraser.

Thus, June 2026 [consolidated](#) Latvia's position as one of the most dynamically developing centres of drone technology in Europe. At the same time, the production emphasis remains defensive: the focus is on interceptor drones capable of countering, in an economically sustainable manner, both deliberate attacks and drone incursions. This approach fits the logic of "deterrence by denial" and is consistent with NATO's broader shift on the eastern flank — from forward presence to forward defence. Compared with Poland, which is building up its offensive potential, the Latvian line appears emphatically defensive, although it does not exclude long-range strike assets: the HIMARS ordered in 2023, with [ATACMS missiles](#), will begin entering service from 2027.

June also demonstrated the deepening of NATO's presence and command. From 4 to 19 June, BALTOPS 26 [took place](#) — the annual multinational naval exercise considered the largest and most strategically significant in the Baltic Sea region. In 2026 the exercise [involved](#) around 6,000 military personnel, 20 ships and more than 20 [aircraft](#) from 15 countries — fewer than in 2025, which is linked to the commitment of part of NATO's assets in the Middle East. Amphibious, air defence, anti-submarine and mine countermeasures operations were practised, as well as operations with unmanned systems. According to the deputy commander, Lieutenant General John Mead, the exercise [pursued](#) three objectives — deterring Russia in the Baltic, building readiness and interoperability, and strengthening cohesion. For the first time since 1972, the exercise was commanded directly from Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFC Brunssum), which means that the command of the exercise has been transferred into NATO's own command chain: the manoeuvres are turning into a rehearsal of the very command mechanisms that would be employed in an actual defence of the region.

One of the key events of June was the [permanent](#) stationing in Daugavpils of units of the NATO Multinational Brigade at the base of the National Guard (Zemessardze) 34th Infantry Battalion. The redeployment of the units took place against the backdrop of the spring exercises Spring Warrior and Crystal Arrow. The exact number of military personnel in Daugavpils is not given; however, the brigade itself, which is based at Ādaži under Canadian command and includes units from 14 countries, [numbers](#) more than 3,500 personnel and reached full combat readiness in 2026. The stationing of units in Daugavpils is significant in two respects — strategic and symbolic. Daugavpils is a logistics hub and a key element of the Baltic Defence Line currently under construction: the city covers an axis along which a potential strike could sever the defensive lines of the Baltic states. The symbolic significance is determined by the ethnic composition: it is the largest Russian-speaking city in Latgale, and the presence of allied forces in Daugavpils serves as a signal both to Moscow and to the domestic audience of [readiness](#) to defend the population irrespective of ethnic and linguistic affiliation. At the same time, such stationing carries a risk: the presence of NATO units in areas inhabited by ethnic Russians may be perceived by Moscow as an escalatory step.

On 30 June the 1 German-Netherlands Corps (1GNC) assumed tactical command of land forces in Latvia and Estonia from Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC NE). The corps is a high-readiness headquarters and is capable of commanding a force of around 50,000 military personnel. As a result of these changes, the eastern flank is being divided into two corps areas of responsibility, as north-eastern Poland and Lithuania remain with MNC NE. In essence, the reorganisation marks a transition from deterrence to a structure designed for large-scale combat operations — even though the corps support units have yet to be formed.

In June, preparations continued for the fortification of the lines along the Latvian–Russian and Latvian–Belarusian borders. Within the framework of the military engineering exercise SĒLIJA CASTLE, a prototype of the Baltic Defence Line was built. Latvian military personnel, together with engineer units of the Michigan National Guard and Danish military personnel, tested a scaled-down replica of the future border fortifications (trenches, fortified positions, “dragon’s teeth”, bunkers). The line itself, initiated by the Baltic states in 2024, is to comprise hundreds of bunkers in addition to natural and man-made obstacles and anti-tank ditches.

To provide the legal basis for the Baltic Defence Line, on 11 June the Saeima adopted amendments to the Protection Zone Law introducing a 30-metre strip along the external land border “to strengthen border security and maintain its infrastructure”. Previously, a special regime applied only to a 12-metre strip, and the amendments were passed under urgent procedure, which underlines the priority that the ruling coalition attaches to the implementation of the Baltic Defence Line.

The need to fortify the border, above all with Belarus, is also reinforced by the narrative of migration pressure on the Latvian–Belarusian border: on 13 June the State Border Guard stopped 205 people attempting to cross the border with Belarus illegally within a single day — at that point the highest daily figure of 2026. In furtherance of measures to combat irregular migration, on 2 July the government extended the enhanced border protection regime until 31 December 2026, while Lithuania, against the backdrop of a more than fourfold increase in secondary migration through Latvia, dispatched its border guard officers to assist their Latvian counterparts.

From 2027, upon the expiry of the deferral provided for by the 2023 law, Latvian citizens permanently residing abroad will also be subject to conscription into the mandatory State Defence Service; in June the Ministry of Defence began outreach work with the diaspora. This step is dictated by the need to expand the trained reserve under demographic constraints: Latvia has approximately 6,200 regular force personnel and 15,900 National Guard personnel. The measure is also relevant against the backdrop of the population’s limited willingness to defend the country: around 37% of residents expressed readiness to defend Latvia with arms in hand — markedly fewer than in Lithuania (52%) and Estonia (45%).

In the political sphere in June, a number of restrictions of a financial, linguistic and cultural nature may also affect the escalatory dynamics in the region. On 11 June the Saeima [adopted](#) a new Immigration Law tightening migration control; on 18 June, amendments to it [closed off](#) access for citizens of Russia and Belarus to residence permits through investment in alternative investment funds. On 19 June President Rinkēvičs returned the law for reconsideration (it was finally adopted on 20 August). On 25 June Minister of Culture Puntulis [obliged](#) the ministry and its subordinate institutions to exclude the Russian language from institutional communication (advertising, official websites, supported projects, international events). In addition, three people were convicted in June in cases of espionage on behalf of Russia — to terms of five to six years.

LITHUANIA

-23

index (sum of scores)
yellow zone

18 events


escalation: 17
de-escalation: 1

-1.3

mean event score
index / number of events


1. Military and political spheres

sum of scores: escalatory events (-) to the left, de-escalatory (+) to the right



2. Extra- and intra-regional events

sum of scores: escalatory events (-) to the left, de-escalatory (+) to the right



3. Distribution of events by score

bar height = number of events with a given score; total 18 events



In June 2026, Lithuania's regional policy in the military, military-technical and diplomatic spheres was shaped by three main lines: 1) the conduct of military exercises and training with NATO allies and the effort to retain the presence of US troops on its territory; 2) the procurement of foreign weapons and military technologies, as well as the development of domestic production (especially of counter-drone assets); and 3) a course towards a long-term severance of interaction with Belarus and Russia.

On 2 June it became known that the withdrawal of more than 1,000 US military personnel stationed in Lithuania on a rotational basis had begun. They are expected to be replaced by a new group of US service members, but the exact timing of their arrival is not yet known. This is linked to the review launched by the Pentagon of the quantitative parameters of US forces and assets in Europe. US troops (at battalion level) have been present on Lithuanian

territory since 2019, and in 2022 their rotational presence was expanded and maintained on an almost continuous basis. The country's authorities regard the US military presence as a cornerstone of their security and are interested in its long-term consolidation and, where possible, expansion.

However, under the prevailing conditions, the Lithuanian government has come to fear that the current rotation may take much longer than before. This potentially raises the question of the prospects for maintaining the US military presence. At the same time, according to Deividas Matulionis, national security adviser to the President of Lithuania, Vilnius has received assurances from Washington that the American presence in the country will be maintained, despite its review in respect of Europe as a whole.

From 1 to 5 June, the Lithuanian Armed Forces [conducted](#) the exercise Vanguard 26 at the Rūdninkai training area. During the exercise, privately developed systems for the detection and destruction of drones and balloons in the air and on the ground were tested. Developments by 15 companies from Lithuania, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Poland and Belgium were employed.

Lithuanian military personnel also [took part](#) in the two-week naval exercise BALTOPS 26, which began on 4 June. Given the current military-political conditions in the Baltic Sea region, particular attention was paid to the exercise.

Throughout June, the first exercise, Freedom Shield 26-I, of the Bundeswehr's 45th Armoured Brigade (Panzerbrigade 45 "Litauen") stationed in Lithuania [took place](#) in Pabradė (in the Švenčionys district bordering Belarus). The manoeuvres involved around 2,900 military personnel and 800 items of heavy equipment, including from the NATO Multinational Battlegroup Lithuania, other Bundeswehr units and the armed forces of Lithuania itself. Puma infantry fighting vehicles and Leopard tanks were transferred from Germany to take part. As reported, the exercise employed, in "real conditions", "all elements of modern combat — drones, mortars, artillery, combat helicopters and tanks, as well as infantry fighting vehicles". Upon completion of the manoeuvres, most of the heavy weaponry returned to Germany; however, it is due to arrive in Lithuania again next year, when the military town in Rūdninkai intended for the permanent stationing of the German brigade will be fully completed.

On 10 June, Minister of National Defence Robertas Kaunas [signed](#) an agreement with Luxembourg on the use of satellite communications services. Under the arrangement, Luxembourg allocated €2.5 million for the development of the project. Vilnius's heightened interest in intensive cooperation with Luxembourg in this field stems from the fact that the latter is one of the leading European players in the space sector, with an international cluster of companies developing satellite and space technologies operating on its territory.

On 11 June, the Lithuanian Armed Forces [received](#) another batch of Bolide missiles for portable air defence systems, produced by the Swedish company Saab Dynamics. The delivery, worth €7 million, was made under a €320 million contract signed in 2025. The

systems have a range of up to 9 km and are distinguished by their mobility, ease of use and high resistance to electronic warfare means. They can be used against aircraft as well as low-flying objects.

On 17 June, Lithuania [signed](#) a multilateral agreement with the Netherlands, Finland, Norway and Sweden on the joint procurement of 100 CV90 infantry fighting vehicles manufactured by BAE Systems Hägglunds. The first deliveries are expected in 2028.

On 29 June, the Lithuanian Armed Forces [reported](#) the delivery of a batch of Estonian M14 anti-tank mines worth over €3 million. Vilnius plans to stockpile anti-tank and anti-personnel mines as part of its work to strengthen border defence. Storage facilities for anti-tank fortification structures are also being built, and bridges are being [prepared](#) for rapid demolition in the event of an armed attack.

On 15 June, the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [summoned](#) the Belarusian chargé d'affaires ad interim and expressed a strong protest to him over “numerous violations” of Lithuanian airspace from Belarusian territory in May and June. At the same time, Vilnius rejected accusations by Minsk concerning the incident of 17 May involving a drone that had entered Belarus. The ministry stated that the country’s competent authorities had not recorded any violations of Belarusian airspace from Lithuania.

Also on 15 June, Interior Minister Vladislavas Kondratovičius [announced](#) that Lithuania will continue the practice of physically pushing migrants back into the territory of Belarus, despite the entry into force of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. This was a response to calls by a number of NGOs in Lithuania, Latvia and Poland to reconsider the practice, as it does not comply with obligations in the field of fundamental human rights. In the view of the Lithuanian government, physical pushbacks remain lawful under the state of emergency currently in force at the border. This practice was legalised in 2023, although it had already been applied since 2021.

In parallel, the Lithuanian parliament denounced the agreement with Belarus on movement in the border area [Translator’s Note: this refers to the 2010 Lithuania–Belarus agreement on local border traffic, which never entered into force.], which had been signed in 2010 but was never implemented: the procedure [began](#) on 15 June, and the Seimas [adopted](#) the final decision on 30 June. The agreement provided for the possibility for residents of border districts to cross the border with special permits and to stay in the territory of the neighbouring country for up to 90 days in a six-month period.

EVENT CATALOGUE

Events on which the indices are based

Events are listed in chronological order. Each event description contains a link to the primary source; where there are several sources, additional links are marked [2], [3]. Scores are assigned on a scale from -5 to +5 (see the annex): “minus” denotes escalation, “plus” de-escalation.

Belarus — 15 events, index -5

Date	Event	Score
1–6 June	First mandatory annual ten-day field training camps held for 10th-grade pupils	-1
3 June	Defence Minister Khrenin at the CSTO Council of Defence Ministers: probability of a military conflict being unleashed against Russia and Belarus is “extremely high”	-1
3 June	Territorial defence training assembly in Vitebsk Oblast; Chief of the General Staff Muraveiko: the number of territorial defence activities will grow, with one-third of the reservist pool to be assigned to them	-2
3 June	House of Representatives ratified the protocol amending the Belarus–Russia treaty on military-technical cooperation of 10 December 2009	-1
4 June	Flight-tactical exercise of the Air Force and Air Defence Forces involving three air bases (over 30 aircraft airborne simultaneously)	-1
5 June	Lukashenko: “We do not want to wage war” against Poles, Lithuanians and Ukrainians	+2
8 June	Advance notification of mobilisation exercises in Grodno Oblast, with an explanation of their content and associated activities	+1
11 June	Staff training with the territorial defence directorate	-1
15 June	Lukashenko interview with Al Arabiya: spillover of the war into Belarus is unacceptable; call for nuclear disarmament	+2
17 June	Mobilisation exercise with the region’s military commissariats began in Grodno Oblast	-2
17 June	Meeting between SAMI Chairman Pantus and Russia’s FSVTS First Deputy Director Boitsov: roadmap on the servicing of aviation equipment signed	-1
18 June	Meeting chaired by the President on the Armed Forces Construction and Development Plan for 2026–2030; statement on reinforcing protection of the southern border	-1
21 June	Defence Minister Khrenin: Belarus’s strategy is to avoid being drawn into the conflict and to ensure the security of its citizens	+1

Date	Event	Score
22 June	State Secretary of the Security Council Volfovich: drawing Belarus into the conflict “will not work”; Minsk favours resolving issues through diplomatic means	+1
25 June	4th International Anti-Fascist Congress in Minsk (25–27 June): a number of anti-European statements, including by Defence Minister Khrenin [2] [3]	-1
Total	15 events	-5

Kaliningrad Oblast — 7 events, index -6

Date	Event	Score
10 June	Baltic Fleet naval aviation exercise	-1
11 June	Exercise involving two small missile ships	-1
16 June	Baltic Fleet naval aviation exercise	-1
22 June	Governor’s decree establishing the Ministry of Regional Security of Kaliningrad Oblast (operational from 29 June)	-2
23 June	Statement by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grushko on the NATO exercise Dzielny Dzik (“Brave Boar”)	+1
23 June	Exercise involving a Baltic Fleet corvette and patrol ship	-1
26 June	Baltic Fleet anti-submarine exercise	-1
Total	7 events	-6

Poland — 17 events, index -21

Date	Event	Score
June (whole month)	Public criticism of huge military contracts and disputes within the Polish establishment [2]	+1
2 June	Preliminary behind-the-scenes talks on deploying US nuclear-armed bombers in Poland	-2
4–19 June	BALTOPS 26 exercise off the Polish coast under the command of the US Sixth Fleet	-1
8–19 June	NATO air exercise Ramstein Flag 26	-2
12 June	First F-35s inducted into service	-2
12 June	Poll revealing negative attitudes towards rising military spending	+1
13–19 June	Territorial defence exercise Ognista Burza-26 (“Fire Storm”)	-1
15–22 June	Three new agreements with foreign partners on establishing joint production of 155 mm ammunition	-2
15 June	Decision to procure 32 F-35s	-2
16 June	Government resolution launching the establishment of a permanent US base	-2

Date	Event	Score
16–26 June	Multinational exercise Dzielny Dzik 2026 (“Brave Boar”)	–1
17 June	Poland–Germany military cooperation agreement	+1
24 June	Contract for a further 46,000 MSBS Grot assault rifles for the Polish Armed Forces	–2
25 June	Delivery of another batch of Abrams tanks (36 main battle tanks and 7 armoured recovery vehicles)	–2
29 June	Polish–Swedish consultations at defence minister level, focused mainly on military issues in the Baltic Sea	–1
29 June	Agreement with Sweden on the purchase of three submarines and the lease of one	–2
30 June	Area of operations of the Multinational Corps Northeast narrowed to north-eastern Poland and Lithuania	–2
Total	17 events	–21

Latvia — 20 events, index –28

Date	Event	Score
3 June	Latvia and Finland agreed to jointly develop a new type of CPV (Common Protected Vehicle)	–1
4 June	Annual NATO exercise BALTOPS 26	–1
5 June	First EU FPV drone pilot training course held at the Sēlija training area	–1
5 June	NATO Multinational Brigade stationed in Daugavpils for the first time	–2
8 June	NATO fighter jets shot down a drone over Latvia for the first time	–2
9 June	International air defence exercise Baltic Zenith 2026 held	–1
9 June	Latvia and Ukraine signed a “drone deal”	–2
9 June	Prototype of the Baltic Defence Line tested	–2
10 June	Latvia and Poland to cooperate on ammunition	–1
11 June	30-metre strip introduced along the external border	–2
11 June	Compulsory military service extended to the diaspora	–1
13 June	New record set for illegal border crossings from Belarus	0
15 June	Riga Airport borrowed €30 million to reconstruct a dual-use zone	–1
15 June	Latvia and the US signed a letter of intent on UAV cooperation	–1
18 June	Investors from Russia and Belarus restricted in access to residence permits under the new Immigration Law	–2
23 June	First anti-aircraft missile plant in the Baltic states opened in Riga	–2
25 June	Ministry of Culture banned the Russian language in its institutions	–1
26 June	Two people convicted in Riga of spying for Russia	–1

Date	Event	Score
30 June	Latvian national convicted of spying for the GRU	-1
30 June	German-Netherlands Corps assumed command of forces in Latvia and Estonia	-3
Total	20 events	-28

Lithuania — 18 events, index -23

Date	Event	Score
2 June	Over 1,000 US troops left Lithuania upon completion of their rotation	+1
4 June	Annual BALTOPS 26 exercise with the participation of Lithuania and 15 NATO countries (4–19 June)	-1
5 June	Vanguard 26: tests of systems for detecting and destroying drones and balloons	-1
8 June	Vilnius Airport closed at night due to smuggling balloons from Belarus; authorities called it a hybrid attack	-1
10 June	Germany's 45th Armoured Brigade, permanently stationed in Lithuania, held the large-scale Freedom Shield 26-I exercise near the Belarusian border (Pabradė, about 2,900 troops, 7–8 NATO countries)	-1
10 June	Lithuania signed a military satellite communications agreement with Luxembourg	-1
11 June	Lithuania received a batch of Bolide anti-aircraft missiles for RBS 70 air defence systems worth approximately €7 million	-2
15 June	Interior Minister: Lithuania will maintain migrant pushbacks at the Belarusian border despite the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum applying from 12 June	-1
15 June	Lithuania summoned Belarus's chargé d'affaires a.i. and delivered a strong protest over airspace violations	-2
15 June	Lithuanian state-owned plant began production of counter-drone ammunition	-2
17 June	Lithuania and the US signed a drone cooperation agreement	-1
17 June	Lithuania's partners signed an agreement on implementing the CV90 infantry fighting vehicle project	-2
18 June	RSI Europe (Lithuania) and The Fourth Law (Ukraine) signed a memorandum on joint drone production in Lithuania	-1
22 June	Klaipėda prosecutors referred to court the espionage case of a Russian FSB officer (to be tried in absentia)	-1
24 June	Lithuania received the first tranche of €956.3 million under the EU SAFE defence instrument	-2
25 June	Lithuania extended 12 no-fly zones along the Belarusian border until 1 January 2027	-1

Date	Event	Score
29 June	<u>Lithuanian Armed Forces received Estonian anti-tank mines worth over €3 million</u>	-2
30 June	<u>Seimas denounced the 2010 agreement with Belarus on local border traffic [2]</u>	-2
Total	18 events	-23

ANNEX

Minsk Radar draws on the event analysis and event quantification methodology tested in the Minsk Barometer. The authors track the dynamics of the military and military-political situation in the region, catalogue events and assign each of them a numerical value. The resulting indices show the direction and speed of movement of the monitored entities, and of the region as a whole, along the escalation ladder.

Scope of monitoring

The geographical scope is the region around the Suwałki Corridor: from the Baltic Sea coast to the junction of the borders of Belarus, Poland and Ukraine. The monitored entities are Belarus, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast. The monitoring covers the actions of the states themselves, as well as the activity of extra-regional actors and military-political blocs (NATO, the EU, the CSTO, the Union State, etc.) on their territory or in relation to them.

Hostilities in Ukraine are not included in the monitoring, as they require separate, more specialised examination. Their impact on the situation in the region is taken into account indirectly.

Event selection and sources

The catalogue includes events in the military and political spheres that affect the escalation or de-escalation of tension between military-political blocs in the region. Each event is entered in the monitoring log with its date, dynamics (escalation or de-escalation), sphere (military or political), category (matrix indicator), level (intra- or extra-regional), score and a link to the primary source.

The source base comprises the official websites and channels of state bodies and armed forces, departmental publications, national and international media, and specialist industry outlets. A full list of sources for the period is provided in the event catalogue: each event in the catalogue contains a link to the primary source.

Event scoring scale

Each event is assigned a single score on a scale from -5 to +5. The “minus” sign denotes escalation and “plus” de-escalation; “0” means that the event has been recorded but is neutral with respect to regional tension.

For each matrix indicator, a range of admissible scores is defined. The lower bound of the range corresponds to the minimal (basic) form of activity — as a rule, 1 point: a single contract, a statement, reinforced border security, etc.; the upper bound corresponds to the most intensive form. The exceptions are border and military incidents, as well as severance

of relations and provocations, which are classified as serious events from the outset. The score within the range is chosen taking into account the scale of the event, its proximity to strategic centres, the involvement of service branches and foreign contingents, and its impact on the balance of power.

A. Military and security sphere

Escalatory dynamics (–)

Nº	Indicator	Range	Guidance for choosing the score
1	Militarisation (build-up of offensive/defensive weapons, large-volume procurement, growth in armed forces personnel)	–2...–4	Delivery of arms and military equipment — 1–2; large-scale rearmament and armed forces growth — up to 4
2	Growth of military budgets	–1...–3	Notable increase in defence spending — 2; major increase — 3
3	Intensification of defence-industrial activity (growth in orders, new types of weapons, new production facilities)	–1...–3	Supply contract — 1; new types of arms and military equipment and new production facilities — up to 3
4	Creation of new military units, formations, service branches, bases and arsenals	–2...–4	New brigade-level unit — 2; creation of bases/arsenals near the border — up to 4
5	Redeployment of troops and hardware towards the borders of blocs	–2...–4	Troop movements — 2; major redeployment towards the border — up to 4
6	Changes to armed forces recruitment and training rules (expansion of the reserve)	–1...–3	Documents/laws — 1–2; large-scale expansion of the reserve — up to 3
7	Intensification of mobilisation measures	–2...–5	Preparatory measures — 2; full mobilisation — 5
8	Conduct of military exercises	–1...–4	Exercises of various levels — 1–3; foreign contingents, proximity to the border, offensive operations — up to 4
9	Deepening of military integration within blocs / new military alliances	–1...–4	Documents/regimes — 1–2; new military alliance — up to 4
10	Hardening of the border security regime	–1...–2	Reinforced border security — 1; sharp tightening — 2
11	Fortification works on the border	–1...–3	Isolated engineering works — 1; extended, echeloned defensive lines — up to 3
12	Border incidents	–1...–5	Migration incidents — 1–2; military incidents — 3–4; with casualties/escalation — 5

De-escalatory dynamics (+)

Nº	Indicator	Range	Guidance for choosing the score
1	Demilitarisation (reduction of weapons and armed forces personnel)	+1...+4	Mirrors militarisation
2	Reduction of military budgets	+1...+2	Mirrors growth in spending
3	Scaling down of defence-industrial activity (conversion, freezing of development programmes)	+1...+3	Mirrors intensification of the defence industry
4	Disbanding of units, closure of bases and arsenals	+1...+4	Mirrors creation of units/bases
5	Withdrawal of troops and hardware from borders, zones of reduced military activity	+1...+4	Mirrors redeployment towards the border
6	Easing of recruitment and training rules, reduction of the reserve	+1...+3	Mirrors changes to recruitment rules
7	Winding down of mobilisation measures	+2...+5	Mirrors mobilisation measures
8	Reduction in the scale of exercises, notification of manoeuvres, admission of observers	+1...+4	The monitoring rewards notifications/observers; mirrors exercises
9	Freezing of military integration within blocs, inter-bloc dialogue	+1...+4	Mirrors integration; institutional dialogue
10	Easing of the border security regime	+1...+2	Mirrors border security
11	Dismantling of border fortifications, creation of buffer zones	+1...+3	Mirrors fortifications
12	Creation of mechanisms for preventing and investigating border incidents	+3...+5	Mirrors border incidents

B. Political sphere

Escalatory dynamics (-)

Nº	Indicator	Range	Guidance for choosing the score
1	Negative information campaigns	-1...-2	Information counteraction — 1; sustained campaign — 2
2	Negative statements by key figures (president, prime minister, ministers, heads of parliament/intelligence services)	-1...-2	Negative statements — 1; harsh rhetoric by top officials — 2
3	Doctrinal and legislative changes conducive to escalation	-1...-3	Documents/laws — 1–2; major doctrinal shift — up to 3
4	Lobbying for discriminatory measures within integration frameworks	-1...-3	Isolated démarche — 1; systematic lobbying — up to 3 (delaying/non-invitation — 2)
5	Expulsion of diplomats, protest notes, publicising of espionage cases	-1...-4	Protest notes — 2; expulsion/recall of ambassadors — 4; espionage — 3

Nº	Indicator	Range	Guidance for choosing the score
6	Violation of treaties and mutual commitments	-2...-4	Violation of treaties — 3; minor — 2; gross — 4
7	Denunciation of existing international agreements	-2...-4	By analogy with violation of treaties (-3); major denunciation — 4
8	Imposition of sanctions and restrictive measures	-2...-4	Sanctions/trade wars/embargoes — 3-4; limited measures — 2
9	Restriction of cross-border movement	-1...-3	Partial restriction — 1; complete closure — 3
10	Severance of diplomatic relations, provocation of aggressive actions	-4...-5	Severance of diplomatic relations, provocations, hostilities — 4-5 — top of the scale

De-escalatory dynamics (+)

Nº	Indicator	Range	Guidance for choosing the score
1	Positive information campaigns, joint communication initiatives	+1...+2	Positive statements/materials — 1; campaign — 2
2	Constructive/conciliatory statements by key state figures	+1...+2	Mirrors negative statements
3	Doctrinal and legislative changes that reduce tension	+1...+3	Mirrors escalatory doctrines
4	Lobbying for cooperation and mutual recognition measures	+1...+3	Mirrors discriminatory lobbying
5	Return of diplomats, goodwill notes, non-public settlement of incidents	+2...+4	Mirrors expulsions/espionage cases
6	Compliance with and reaffirmation of treaties and mutual commitments	+2...+4	Mirrors violation of treaties
7	Resumption of suspended agreements, conclusion of new treaties	+2...+5	Important treaty — 4; integration/major treaty — up to 5
8	Lifting or easing of sanctions and restrictive measures	+2...+4	Mirrors sanctions
9	Simplification of the cross-border movement regime	+1...+3	Mirrors restriction of movement
10	Restoration of diplomatic relations, renunciation of provocations, gestures of goodwill	+4...+5	Mirrors severance of diplomatic relations — top of the scale

Intensity levels (absolute value of the score)

Score	Level	Typical events
1	Basic	Isolated statements, information campaigns, budget/spending, contract, border security, migration
2	Moderate	Deliveries of arms and military equipment, troop movements, doctrines/laws, fortifications, restriction of movement
3	Significant	Intensification of the defence industry, new units/bases, exercises, integration, sanctions, violation/denunciation of treaties
4	Serious	Border/military incidents, expulsion of diplomats, large-scale rearmament
5	Critical	Full mobilisation, severance of diplomatic relations, provocations involving the use of force

Calculation of indices

- **Index of a monitored entity** — the sum of the scores of all its events over the period.
- **Regional index** — the median of the indices of the five monitored entities. The median is used so that a single entity with an anomalously high or low value does not distort the overall picture.
- **Intra- and extra-regional components** — the sums of scores for events of the corresponding level. Intra-regional events comprise a state's own measures and its interaction with other monitored entities, Russia and Ukraine; extra-regional events are those involving external actors and blocs (the EU, NATO, the CSTO, allies outside the region and other global partners). The difference between the two components constitutes the balance.
- **Mean event score** — the index divided by the number of events; used as an auxiliary indicator of event intensity.

Colour scale of regional tension

The index value is converted into a five-level colour scale inherited from the Minsk Barometer (an adapted Torino scale). Since Minsk Radar records significantly more events for each entity, the scale thresholds have been raised. Different thresholds are used for monthly and quarterly periods: the quarterly thresholds are three times higher than the monthly ones. The pilot issue covers one month (June 2026) and therefore applies the monthly scale.

Zone	Month	Quarter	Interpretation
White	0 and above	0 and above	Calm, non-threatening situation
Green	-1...-15	-1...-45	Low activity
Yellow	-16...-30	-46...-90	Activity capable of leading to escalation
Orange	-31...-45	-91...-135	Military preparations, rising tension
Red	-46 and below	-136 and below	Sharp rise in tension, pre-war state

Limitations

The choice of a specific score within the defined range rests on the analyst's expert judgement. To reduce subjectivity, the ranges and guidance for each indicator are fixed in the scale, and each score is accompanied by a link to the primary source. The number of recorded events depends, among other things, on states' informational openness and the availability of sources, which may create asymmetry between the monitored entities. The pilot issue serves to test the methodology; the scale and thresholds may be refined following expert discussions.

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